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Abstract
This paper takes up Adorno’s aesthetics as a dialectic between
philosophy and art. In doing so, I argue that art provides a
unique way of mediating between theory and practice, between
concepts and experience, and between subjectivity and
objectivity, because in art these relations are flexible and left
open to interpretation, which allows a form of thinking that can
point beyond itself. Adorno thus uses reflection on art as a
corrective for philosophy and its tendency towards ideology.
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory begins by questioning the possibility of its very
object of investigation: art. “It is self-evident that nothing concerning art is
self-evident anymore, not its inner life, not its relation to the world, not even
its right to exist… It is uncertain whether art is still possible…” (Adorno,
2006: 1). This observation throws into question the possibility of Adorno’s
aesthetic theory. How are we to think about art when nothing about art,
including its very possibility, is evident? Where are we to begin? To
complicate the matter further, Adorno’s Draft Introduction to Aesthetic
Theory describes how works of art defy our efforts to conceptualize them
such that “[a]esthetics is compelled to drag its concepts helplessly behind a
situation of art” (Adorno, 2006: 339). Adorno further notes that aesthetics
has fallen out of favor in academic inquiry. The hope of attaining a
systematic approach to aesthetics that is relevant to other theoretical areas,
such as epistemology or metaphysics, sounds anachronistic—a relic from
19th century philosophy and the ideal of an absolute science that can unify
all philosophical investigations.1 Adorno thus problematizes aesthetics on
two fronts: its relation to concrete works of art and its relation to other forms
of theory. Yet this two-fold problem does not undermine the possibility of
aesthetics. Rather these very problems create the impetus for Adorno’s
Aesthetic Theory because they indicate that art is an activity of resistance. 
For Adorno it is these very problems—the contradictions and
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impossibilities in and between art and thinking about art—that allow
aesthetics to provide a proper space and process for contemporary theory
and praxis. Adorno states that “[t]he task of aesthetics is not to comprehend
artworks as hermeneutical objects; in the contemporary situation, it is their
incomprehensibility that needs to be comprehended” (Adorno, 2006: 118).2
This task of aesthetics, comprehending the incomprehensible, is obviously
contradictory. This inherent contradiction, however, is not meant to be
resolved or to find a positive solution. Instead, we must explore the depth
and negative relations of these contradictions to understand their full
significance. 
This paper will demonstrate how Adorno’s aesthetics attempts to
think the incomprehensible in a way that is fruitful on the side of theory as
well as practice. The problematic effort to relate theory and art—or to create
art at all—reflects the attempt to re-envision social and political practices
without merely subjecting thought to the same forms of domination that it
seeks to overcome. By thinking the impossible art and aesthetic theory enact
a form of negative dialectics between theory and praxis, between concepts
and experience, and between the subject and object, which Adorno uses as
a corrective for philosophy. 
Between Theory & Praxis: Utopia and Art
The contradictions within Aesthetic Theory gesture towards the tension
between theory and praxis. Adorno thematizes this tension throughout his
writings, especially insofar as the culmination of theory and practice—
utopia—creates a particularly difficult and contradictory relation. In Minima
Moralia, Adorno states that the goal for philosophy is to see everything from
the ’standpoint of redemption’—from the perspective of the utopian ideal
(Adorno, 2005: §153). This standpoint is both the easiest perspective to attain
and the most difficult: “It is the simplest of all things, because the situation
calls imperatively for such knowledge… But it is also the utterly impossible
thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s
breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any
possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is…” (Adorno,
2005: §153). Although we must think and create new possibilities, we cannot
simply think of something outside of actuality. We can never escape what is
in order to arrive at a pure form of what should be. We cannot have the
perspective of redemption even though every instance points towards its
necessity. For Adorno, we must contemplate the impossibility of redemption
in order to have any sense of its possibility (Adorno, 2005: §153). Due to the
impossible nature of redemption, the utopian ideal cannot be objectified or
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realized through action, but must be contemplated as the incomprehensible. 
For Adorno, contemplating the incomprehensible is not resignation
or defeatism, but a more determined commitment to utopianism by rejecting
all of the easy answers of naïve, non-dialectical social activism, or “pseudo-
activity”, which do not and cannot recognize the impossible (Adorno, 1998:
287). In his 1969 radio address “Resignation”, Adorno discusses the need to
rethink the relation between theory and praxis such that they form a more
dialectical relation: “Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what
already exists anyway. As long as it doesn’t break off, thinking has a secure
hold on possibility. Its insatiable aspect, its aversion to being quickly and
easily satisfied, refuses the foolish wisdom of resignation” (Adorno, 1998:
292). In this sense, it is thought that allows the possibility of utopia. In
contemplating the impossibility of utopia, thought does not objectify
redemption and thus undermines its possibility by reducing or conflating it
to the current forms of domination, or what is. In this sense, thought bears
the weight of redemption that praxis loses when it attempts to throw off
thought for the sake of action. As Adorno proposes:
The utopian moment in thinking is stronger the less it—this too
a form of relapse—objectifies itself into a utopia and hence
sabotages its realization. Only thinking points beyond itself. For
its part a comportment, a form of praxis, it is more akin to
transformative praxis than a comportment that is compliant for
the sake of praxis. Prior to all particular content, thinking is
actually the force of resistance (Adorno, 1998: 292-293)
Thought is a form of resistance because it recognizes the impossibility of
utopia, which allows its possibility. Within this contradiction, however, we
see that thought should not be separated from praxis, but forms its own
dialectical movement between theory and practice. 
Given this dialectical movement between theory and praxis, the
tension between art as a concrete practice and philosophy as a theoretical
process does not undermine aesthetics but instead elevates it. Aesthetics
draws out the very tensions that are significant to Adorno’s philosophy. For
Adorno, positive accounts of utopia always fall into the error of ideology
and undermine the possibility of utopia. Thus the very illusory and
incommensurable nature of art allows it to fulfill the social function of
utopianism without becoming ideology. Like utopianism, works of art
envision possibility and create something new. Yet art cannot create from
nothing and must draw its possibilities from what is. Art negates what is,
without merely reasserting another positive option that would fail by trying
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to make its ideal concrete and actual, and in this sense allows the possibility
of utopia without any trace of ideology. If a work of art attempted to
concretize an ideal, it would be too literal and become mere propaganda,
not art: “Artworks that unfold to contemplation and thought without any
remainder are not artworks” (Adorno, 2006: 121).3 As such artistic practices
are practices that resist the error of ideologies that attempt to realize utopias
concretely and thus cancel its possibility.4 Here we gain some insight as to
why Adorno’s late works privilege aesthetics and make it central to his
thought.5
In rethinking this relation between theory and practice, we see why
aesthetics becomes so central to Adorno since art occupies this troubled
interface between thought and action. Adorno further problematizes the
dialectic between thought and praxis in his account of experience and
concepts. Just as Adorno rejects positive approaches to utopianism, which
fall into ideology, so he also rejects an epistemological framework that
accepts experience as simply given, i.e. positivism. Through his critique of
positivism, Adorno further indicates an open space for art. 
Between Experience and Concepts: Infinite Mediation, Negative
Dialectics, and Art
In his treatment of different ways of theorizing, Adorno rejects
epistemological frameworks that take experience to be unproblematic and
immediately given, especially positivism. In Minima Moralia, Adorno frames
the problem of positivism as an issue of distance—or lack of critical distance,
since positivism takes experience to be transparent and immediately
available to thought. This assumption of immediacy undermines the
possibility of thought grasping anything. When we attempt to grasp facts
and to take experience as literal, i.e. given without the need for
interpretation, we fail to grasp anything. By ignoring the mediated relation
between thought and reality, thinking fails to understand anything—its
supposedly given object and itself: “as soon as thought repudiates its
inviolable distance and tries with a thousand subtle arguments to prove its
literal correctness, it flounders. If it leaves behind the medium of virtuality,
of anticipation that cannot be wholly fulfilled by any single piece of actuality;
in short, if instead of interpretation it seeks to become mere statement,
everything it states becomes, in fact, untrue” (Adorno, 2005: §82). In this
sense, thought cannot approach experience as empirical data or discrete
information or assert a statement of fact. Nothing is immediate or factual—
everything is mediated. 
Nevertheless, this mediation prevents thought from reducing itself
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to the abbreviated form of the actual and opens up the possibility of
intellectual inquiry that can “illuminate the realm of facticity…with
reflections of a different type” (Adorno, 1997: 7). Facticity describes the
thisness of experience, the here and now, which is not immediately given or
completely analyzable.6 The realm of facticity presents itself as a complex of
conceptually mediated contradictions, the true that is always false in some
sense, the continually negated whole. As he states in his foreword to the
English translation of Prisms, Adorno considers “matters of fact to be not
mere fact, unreflected and thinglike, but rather processes of infinite
mediation, never to be taken at face-value” (Adorno, 1997: 7). Experience is
given in one sense and infinitely removed in another because of this infinite
mediation. 
The concept of infinite mediation distinguishes Adorno’s negative
dialectics from Hegel’s dialectics. In some ways, Adorno adopts dialectical
thought from Hegel. Dialectics in general relates to the problematic effort of
thought to subsume particulars under universals—i.e. the problem of
conceptualizing experience. “The name of dialectics says no more, to begin
with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a
remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy”
(Adorno, 2005a: 5). Adorno, however, distinguishes his dialectics from
Hegelian dialectics because Hegel’s idealism requires that dialectics find
resolution, i.e. that dialectic method ends in the assertion of some positive
form of truth or identity—the truth of the whole.7 Since the insight of
dialectics is the contradiction between objects and the concepts we use to
identify them, Hegelian dialectics does not sustain a meaningful relation to
objects of experience and instead subsumes them into one concept as an
absolute identity. For Hegel, double negation leads to identity. His dialectical
thought ends with the Absolute.8
For Adorno, the negation of dialectical thought does not lead to
identity because there can be no synthesis. He claims that the “nonidentical
is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it
obtainable by a negation of the negative. This negation is not an affirmation
itself, as it is to Hegel…To equate the negation of negation with positivity is
the quintessence of identification” (Adorno, 2005a: 158). For Adorno, Hegel’s
positive synthesis of identification undermines dialectics, which is
necessarily negative since “dialectics means to break the compulsion to
achieve identity” (Adorno, 2005a: 157). Hegel’s dialectics suspends identity,
but then asserts a higher, more absolute form of identity. For this reason,
Adorno describes his own thought as negative dialectics in order to maintain,
and not resolve, the problematic relation between objects of our experience
and the concepts we use to analyze them.9 Adorno’s dialectics is essentially
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a way of thinking through contradictions without canceling those
contradictions in order to indicate “the untruth of identity, the fact that the
concept does not exhaust the thing conceived” (Adorno, 2005a: 5). 
Adorno’s negative dialectics thus works with these contradictions,
in particular the contradiction between objects of experience and the
concepts we use to identify them. In understanding these contradictions
which come to the fore through the process of dialectic negation, we see that
objects always elude thought. We do not have immediate access to objects
through experience. Experience is always mediated. This mediation not only
prevents thought from subsuming objects completely into its concepts, but
it also serves to indicate the sense in which objects are incommensurable
with empirical data and cannot be reduced to or specified in concrete terms.
While Adorno addresses these issues throughout his corpus, they are central
to his Aesthetic Theory. Moreover, in posing these questions in terms of works
of art and aesthetic theory, Adorno demonstrates the way in which aesthetics
serves negative dialectics. We come to understand the nature of philosophy
and thought in understanding how aesthetics situates itself in this
contradiction between experience and concepts. This mediation between
thought and its object is especially pronounced within aesthetics’ attempt to
understand the work of art.10
With aesthetics, art relates to thought but is not immediately
comprehensible – there is no intuitional understanding or immediate
experience of art. An artwork that is completely obvious and immediately
grasped would lack any artistry. Such art would be too literal, as “[t]he literal
is barbaric. Totally objectified, by virtue of its rigorous legality, the artwork
becomes a mere fact and is annulled as art” (Adorno, 2006:61). Art cannot
be mere fact. Instead, art is factical. Art always invites us to consider it more,
to examine it from a different perspective, to see it transformed by another
context. Art resists thought—which always seeks to understand through
analyzing separate parts that can be resolved into concepts. Understanding
art is not consonant with dissecting and analyzing each individual element,
because the reduction of the work of art to its separate pieces still does not
achieve a comprehensive grasp of it as a whole: “As soon as one imagines
having a firm grasp on the details of an artwork, it dissolves into the
indeterminate and undifferentiated, so mediated is it” (Adorno, 2006: 101). 
Arthur Danto provides a good example of why dissecting a work of
art into separate analyzable parts prevents understanding it when he
describes a hypothetical exhibit consisting entirely of paintings that look
almost identical—a collection of works that are red paint on canvas (Danto,
1981: 1-4). In one case, however, the painting presents the spiritual turmoil
felt by the Israelites crossing over the red sea. Another painting entitle
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“Nirvana” presents the relation of identity between Nirvanic and Samsara
religion. Another painting is a minimalist geometrical painting entitled “Red
Square”. While the elements of these paintings are all similar, it is impossible
to reduce them to the same identity. Yet what separates them from each
other, as well as what separates them from anyone painting something red
in a non-artistic context, is not obvious to analysis. The analyzable details
are all the same in this instance. As Adorno notes, “the so-called primal
elements turned up by analysis are usually eminently insubstantial. Only
insofar as these elements asymptotically approximate nothingness do they
meld—as a pure process of becoming—into a whole” (Adorno, 2006: 100-
101). That is, only insofar as these elements appear to become one whole, or
give the semblance of meaningful totality, do they relate in a way that can
be grasped by concepts. Yet this whole is still false—it approximates
nothingness—and cannot be given as a complete or positive entity. We can
never pin the work of art down in a sense that clearly defines it. What brings
its discrete elements into one whole lacks proper expression. This process of
becoming whole that expresses nothing mirrors Adorno’s claim that “the
whole is the false” (Adorno, 2005: §29) – the work of art only resembles or
gives the appearance of being whole; it cannot be whole in a true sense. “The
illusory quality of artworks is condensed in their claim to wholeness”
(Adorno, 2006: 101). As such, the work of art is always illusory and only
given in a process of becoming, never as a complete whole to be grasped.
Moreover, the work of art contradicts itself, because even as art presents itself
as existing it still discloses the possibility that it could completely otherwise:
“in an artwork everything can just as well be different from the way it is”
(Adorno, 2006: 101). The work of art is itself mediated through a series of
inner antagonisms: “every element of aesthetic semblance includes aesthetic
inconsistency in the form of contradictions between what the work appears
to be and what it is” (Adorno, 2006:101). Art contradicts itself and what it
presents itself to be; it cannot be a discrete whole easily grasped by thought. 
Understanding art is always mediated through several
contradictions, and yet the work of art is not completely opaque. Instead the
conflict between the work of art as the illusion of a conceptual whole and
the work of art as factical, i.e. that which denies thought, describes the
process of negative dialectics. Thus art occasions thought to realize that it
cannot apply its concepts absolutely, and at the same time thought occasions
the possibility for rescuing art from being treated non-dialectically as simple
fact.11 Adorno asserts that works of art are neither factual nor conceptual,
but still relate to the non-conceptual mediation of thought.12 Adorno
describes this non-conceptual thought of art as the logic of the “as if”
(Adorno, 2006: 137). 
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While Adorno does not describe the logic of the “as if” thoroughly,
it seems to indicate an act of relating two things without determining them
in any absolute sense. Metaphor and simile are ways in which we indicate
“as-if” relations, especially within art, without insisting upon any form of
necessity. The logic drawn is relational, it mediates between two separate
instances or objects, but does not determine either of them or the relation. In
fact, when a metaphor or simile is drawn, it is necessary that it only suggests
similarity or relation without indicating identity. If a metaphor draws a
relation too closely, the metaphor would collapse into identity (A=A) and
would no longer be metaphorical. In this way, the logic of art, i.e. the way in
which we can think of art, allows relation without identity. For this reason,
Adorno relates the logic of art to the logic of our experience because “[i]t
draws consequences from phenomena that have already been spiritually
mediated and to this extent made logical” (Adorno, 2006: 136). Just as
experience always already relies upon the process of applying concepts and
is never grasped through pure intuition, so art is never pure and immediate.
Both art and experience resist concepts and rely upon concepts13—a process
of infinite mediation, or negative dialectics. 
Art and theory form a negative dialectic not simply in terms of its
infinite mediation, but also in terms of what remains inaccessible to thought.
Adorno’s development of negative dialectics is an attempt to think in a way
that allows for incommensurability. The way in which experience denies
commensurate concepts reveals something of our relation to the world and
in effect dismantles simplistic subject-object relations. 
Between Subjects and Objects: Incommensurability and Art
For Adorno the question of how thought appropriates or fails to appropriate
things requires understanding more than the relation between concepts and
experience; it requires understanding the relation between subject and object.
Adorno’s essay “Subject and Object” discusses the problem of epistemology
at the very foundation of its formulation – the relation between subject and
object. This relation between subject and object has proved to be very
problematic throughout the philosophical tradition, and Adorno’s concern
with it is by no means unique. The difference in Adorno’s account, however,
is the way in which he is able to maintain the tension of this problem without
reifying it. 
Adorno maintains this tension in several ways. First of all, Adorno
addresses the subject-object relation without providing a substantial or
determinate definition of either subject or object. Instead of providing such
definitions that would reify the subject and object and assert some form of
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separation, Adorno enters the relation and the debate surrounding it in media
res. Not only does this move avoid the reification of subject and object, but
it also bears witness to the “reciprocal need” between these two ideas
(Adorno, 2006a: 138). The subject cannot be a subject without an object, and
the object cannot be an object without a subject. As such, Adorno cannot
begin with simple definitions of subject and object apart from each other,
which would be not only naïve in terms of their mutual entanglement but
also uncritical in terms of finding the deeper tension between them. For these
reasons, Adorno begins with stating how problematic his topic is: “To
engage in reflections on subject and object poses the problem of stating what
we are to talk about. The terms are patently equivocal” (Adorno, 2006a: 138).
If, on the other hand, Adorno had begun epistemology with the separation
of these equivocal terms, he “would land in an aporia that adds to the
problematics of defining” (Adorno, 2006a: 139). That is, the contradiction of
this attempt would be immediately realized since a definition always implies
objectivity and subjectivity because a definition means that a concept has
effectively captured an object, but that act of capturing implies a subject who
is defining. There is an implied subject and object behind every definition.
Thus beginning from definitions of subject and object is both illogical since
it creates circular reasoning—it assumes in advance the terms that it seeks
to ascertain—and superficial since it fails to understand the constantly
implied subjectivity and objectivity in its own formulation of the problem. 
In dealing with this problem of formulation, Adorno takes us
through a series of necessary contradictions that preserve the tension needed
to develop a critical epistemology in opposition to the naïve epistemologies
of both realists and idealists. The first contradiction Adorno introduces is:
“The separation of subject and object is both real and illusory” (Adorno,
2006a: 139). The separation is true because we experience it cognitively and
can recognize this dichotomy; it is false because in asserting it we reify these
terms apart from each other, which is impossible due to their “reciprocal
need” (Adorno, 2006a: 138). For Adorno, epistemology must recognize and
deal with this contradiction and not lose sight of it. To keep this contradiction
in mind, we must understand how subject and object “mutually mediate –
the object by the subject, and even more, in different ways, the subject by the
object” (Adorno, 2006a: 139). Realists and idealists fail to address this
mediation properly and either liquidates the subject or reduces the object
such that “the subject swallows the object” (Adorno, 2006a: 140). Without
mediation, the separation of subject and object becomes ideology (Adorno,
2006a: 139). 
Adorno’s discussion of subject and object reflects the idea of
mediation and incommensurability, but also formulates its own questions
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in terms of art. As Shierry Weber Nicholsen has stated, “As we know from
Kant, it is in the aesthetic dimension that the intimacy of subject and object
is particularly pronounced, and it is in his aesthetics that Adorno provides
us with his most emphatic model of genuine and valid, if difficult and
problematic subjectivity” (Nicholsen, 1997: 15). In Aesthetic Theory, we can
see how Adorno uses aesthetics and considerations of art to maintain this
negative dialectic between subject and object. For Adorno, art becomes
deaestheticized when it is completely subordinated to the subject and becomes
a vehicle of the spectator (Adorno, 2006: 17). At the same time, the work of
art cannot be absolutely objective or conceived of in-itself, since “absolute
artwork converges with the absolute commodity” (Adorno, 2006: 21). What
defines art cannot be merely the subjective experience of it nor pure facticity
as an object, which would reduce it to a mere commodity. Instead, art must
occupy the intermediate territory where subject and object relate and yet
contradict. In this sense, art recognizes the intimacy of subject and object,
their necessary relation, even in their division: “it is the form of knowledge
that—having preceded the polarity of subject and object—does not recognize
this polarity as definitive” but instead dialectically moves in contradiction
of these poles without ever arriving at synthesis (Adorno, 2006: 111).  As
Weber Nicholsen notes, Adorno’s aesthetic theory draws out this tension in
ways that “Subject and Object” does not:
The work of art may be objective, both in being object—
artifact—and in embodying an objective relationship to
societal dynamics, and in this sense nonsubjective in that it
is not simply an expression of some purportedly unique and
original personality exercising its creativity, but the
objectivity of the artwork is nevertheless mediated both by
the subject who produces it and by the subject who
experiences it. This is the “objective mediatedness of art
through the subject”, in Adorno’s words. It is this quality of
kinship within difference between artwork and subject that
makes the subject-object dialectic particularly acute in the
case of the aesthetic (Nicholsen, 1997: 15-16)
The aesthetic draws out the way in which subjectivity and objectivity are
caught up together. Art thus makes us aware of how we experience and how
we think of experience in problematic and open-ended ways. 
Adorno even claims that art corrects our conception of the subject-
object relation: “Art corrects conceptual knowledge because, in complete
isolation, it carries out what conceptual knowledge in vain awaits from the
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nonpictorial subject-object relation: that through a subjective act what is
objective would be unveiled” (Adorno, 2006: 113). As a subjective act that
reveals the objective, art occupies this space in which subjects and objects
are contradictory and yet in necessary relation to one another, but are a part
of a process of infinite mediation. Art eludes identity; it is an enigma. Art is
never wholly revealed or given over to semblance, even in the infinite
process of mediation: “All artwork—and art together—are enigmas; since
antiquity this has been an irritation to the theory of art. That artworks say
something and in the same breath conceal it…” (Adorno, 2006: 120). If the
work of art did not escape or elude the processes of thinking in some sense,
it would not be art—it would be mere ideology, i.e. something that can be
summed up in its content or the idea it puts forward. 
Since art resists theory in terms of its enigmatic quality, in order to
think about art, aesthetics must attempt to understand what cannot be
understood. Aesthetics must engage art as a question. For Adorno, a work
of art “reveals itself as a question and demands reflection; then the work
vanishes into the distance, only to return to those who thought they
understood it, overwhelming them for a second time with the question
‘What is it?’” (Adorno, 2006: 121). For Adorno, art always invokes a question,
but is never resolved by an answer. The enigma of each work of art is
incommensurable with any answer that could be provided. The work of art
always negates and in doing so continues the process of philosophizing, or
negative dialectics: “art causes people to wonder, just as Plato once
demanded that philosophy do, which, however, decided for the opposite”
(Adorno, 2006: 126). Art enacts the process of questioning that Adorno
wishes to pursue and likewise rejects a positivistic account of art that could
be reduced to its empirical data: “What is essential to art is that which in it
is not the case, that which is incommensurable with the empirical measure
of all things” (Adorno, 2006: 335). Since art always appears as an enigma that
cannot be fully conceptualized but always leaves a remainder, art always
gestures beyond itself towards what is not the case. In this sense, art opens
our thought beyond the limitations of its concepts.
Conclusion: Art as Resistance
Adorno’s aesthetic theory is not confined to the limits of the work of art, as
if this limit could be drawn explicitly and concretely around works of art
without touching upon other questions. Instead, Adorno opens up
philosophical inquiry through aesthetics and thinking about art by
indicating the ways in which practices, concepts, and approaches to objective
knowledge fall short of what they seek. In this sense, the problem of
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aesthetics on the side of theory—that philosophical inquiry cannot have
concrete or determinate principles in relation to art—is actually its strength.
Art and thinking about art allow us to rethink what we take to be merely
given. Aesthetics allows thought to open itself, because art leads to the
wonder that should define philosophy and motivate inquiry continuously,
negatively, and without any pretension to arrive at a synthetic truth of the
whole: “Common to art and philosophy is not the form, not the forming
process… Both keep faith with their own substance through their opposites:
art by making itself resistant to its meanings; philosophy, by refusing to
clutch at any immediate thing” (Adorno, 2005a: 15). In this way art always
relates to utopia—it points towards what is possible beyond the narrow
bounds of the present and allows practices and ways of thinking that resist
the current forms of domination.14
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Endnotes
1 At the time he wrote Aesthetic Theory in the 1960’s, Adorno noted that
“philosophical aesthetics has an antiquated quality, as does the concept of a
system or that of morals. This feeling is in no way restricted to artistic praxis
and the public indifference to aesthetic theory. Even in academic circles,
essays relevant to aesthetics have for decades now noticeably diminished”
(Adorno, 2006: 332). Stephen Regan describes a revival of aesthetic theory
in the 1990s. He cites the announcement of “The Return of the Aesthetic” in
the 1991 volume of the Oxford Art Journal to discuss his point (Regan, 1992).
For Regan, the issue of aesthetics reopened due to the failure of
psychoanalysis and deconstruction to provide a satisfactory account of value
in cultural theory. This edited volume discusses Marxism and the Frankfurt
school in relation to this return to aesthetics.
2 Adorno contrasts his dialectical method to hermeneutics, however, this task
does not have to be anti-hermeneutical. Hermeneutics can be considered as
negative, i.e. as saying the unsaid in a way that preserves the
incommensurability of experience. Cf. Arnason, 1988.
3 For Adorno, art is to be contrasted from both propaganda and mass culture,
which are forms of ideology. In “The Culture Industry”, when Adorno and
Horkheimer discuss the style – or pseudo-style – of products of the culture
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industry, they contrast it to the style of great art. The culture industry does
not produce style, but “the negation of style. The reconciliation of general
and particular, of rules and the specific demands of the subject, through
which alone style takes on substance, is nullified by the absence of tension
between the poles” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 102). This negation of
style is the negation of the particular and the assertion of the universal. It is
the negation of negation. It demonstrates unproblematic synthesis, not
negative dialectics.  
4 Some scholars have considered Adorno’s aesthetic theory to narrow the
relation between theory and practice rather than open it to new possibility.
For a critique of Adorno’s aesthetics cf. Roberts 2009: 92-103.
5 While some have considered Adorno’s movement away from the practices
of social sciences and more concrete analyses such as his work in Stars Down
to Earth towards the more theoretical works on aesthetics to be a movement
towards intellectual resignation and defeatism, others have seen his late
works as hopeful and far from giving up on the possibility of action. Cf.
Sullivan and Lysaker, 1992.
6 The contemporary concept of facticity is derived from the debates between
Neo-Kantians and life-philosophers at the end of the nineteenth century
(Raffoul and Nelson, 2008: 1-2). Facticity takes up the idea of a fact,
something given empirically, but also has the sense of something that is
made (factum) or fabricated. Facticity problematizes what is given to thought
in experience. “Facticity designates a kind of ‘fact’ that has not been
previously thematized in the history of philosophy. Although clearly
contrasted with transcendental ideality and normative validity, it
nonetheless does not designate empirical ‘factuality’, a fact of nature, or an
ontic occurrence. It points to another kind of fact, one that falls out of and
subverts the transcendental/empirical duality” (Raffoul and Nelson, 2008: 2-
3). For this reason, I will distinguish between ‘facts’ in a positivistic, empirical
sense and ‘the factical’ as a subversion of both idealism and realism.   
7 For Hegel, “The True is the whole” (Hegel, 1977: 11). For Adorno, “The
whole is the false” (Adorno, 2005: §29). Adorno negates Hegel’s dialectics. 
8 For another critique of Hegel’s thought as a dialectics of absolute identity,
Cf. Marcuse, 1999.  
9 In his preface to Negative Dialectics, Adorno describes his project as an
attempt to make dialectics thoroughly negative in contrast to the tradition
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of positive dialectics: “As early as Plato, dialectics meant to achieve
something positive by means of negation; the thought figure of a ‘negation
of negation’ later became the succinct term. This book seeks to free dialectics
from such affirmative traits without reducing its determinacy” (Adorno
2005a: xix). Positive dialectics ends in synthesis, i.e. the “return to the starting
point” of thought that “was supposed to bring about a continuous identity
of subject and object” (Adorno 2005a: 156).
10 Adorno’s forward to Prisms describes why he looks at specific artists and
works of art as a way of rejecting “the usual mode of thought which is
content to register facts and prepare them for subsequent facticity” and then
justifies his method in terms of his book Negative Dialectics (Adorno, 1997:
7). 
11 “The truth content of artworks cannot be immediately identified. Just as it
is known only mediately, it is mediated in itself. What transcends the factual
in the artwork, its spiritual content, cannot be pinned down to what is
individually, sensually given but is, rather, constituted by the way of this
empirical givenness. This defines the mediatedness of the truth content”
(Adorno, 2006: 129).
12 “Although artworks are neither conceptual nor judgmental, they are
logical. In them nothing would be enigmatic if their immanent logicality did
not accommodate discursive thought, whose criteria they nevertheless
regularly disappoint” (Adorno, 2006: 136).
13 Adorno’s discussion of this space in between thought and concepts, as well
as the process of mediation, relies upon Kant’s aesthetics. Although Adorno
is critical of Kant’s aesthetics, particularly insofar as he sees that Kant fails
to allow the movement of dialectics, some scholars have attempted to draw
stronger ties between these two thinkers. Cf. Huhn, 1997: 237-257. 
14 I would like to thank Michael Sullivan and Andrew Mitchell for their
critical feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
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